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UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN INDIANA
OLIVER P. FIELD *

This study is a continuation of one published by the
author in volume one of this journal.' It deals with certain
phases of the operation of the power of the courts to declare
laws unconstitutional. It is concerned not so much with
rules of law as with the functioning of a legal power and
practice. This is not to say that rules of law are ignored,
but it is to say that they are assumed as a background for
the study that follows.
Numerous questions arise as one studies these materials
and only a few of them are answered in this article, but
it is hoped that as the study progresses it will be possible
to answer others. . . How long do statutes stay on the books
before being declared unconstitutional. What remedies does
the bar use in assailing unconstitutional statutes? Do judges
divide on constitutional questions as a matter of course or
do they divide at rare intervals?

I
The historical incidence of judicial review of legislation
in Indiana, as in other states, is interesting when placed
against the background of general state and national history.
Reflected in legislation are many of the issues of each period,
numerous social movements, and almost invariably the signs
*
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of transition from period to period. These also appear in our
constitutional decisions. Our interest at this point, however,
is in the experience of legislative sessions with the judicial
review of their statutory product.
The first Indiana Constitution stood as an obstacle to
some legislation. Only a few legislative acts were invalidated
between 1816 and 1852, when the second constitution was
adopted. The first invalid statutes involved court procedure,
false emancipation papers (slaves), regulating execution sales,
and extending the period of redemption (no doubt influenced
by the panic of 1837).2 One statute declared unconstitutional
granted a new trial, a reminder of the indistinct lines recognized between legislative and judicial functions in our early
history.
Following the adoption of the present constitution numerous statutes of 1852 and 1853 were declared unconstitutional. This seems attributable to the transition from the
old constitution to the new with the consequent legislative
activity incident thereto. The 1852 statutes declared unconstitutional related to criminal procedure and law enforcement, three related to courts and their establishment, one
to contracts, two to schools and seminaries of learning, one
to the imposing upon prisoners the costs of trials, one related
to contracts with negroes, and two dealt with highways. The
output of the 1853 session reflected the legislatures interest
in the problems of local government. Some statutes on that
subject and some in the field of decedents' estates and courts
were declared invalid.

Session
1817
1821
1840
1843
1844
1852
1853
1855
1859

Number of Statutes Declared Unconstitutional
Arranged by Enacting Sessions
No. of Unconst'l
Session
No. of Unconst'l
Statutes
Statutes
1
1891
9
1
1893
4
1
1895
2
2
1897
1
1
1899
7
14
1901
6
7
1903
7
7
1905
1
3
1907
4

"In an extensive appendix at the end of the article all statutes
declared unconstitutional are set forth, see infra p. 115.

1941J
1861
1865
1867
1869
1871
1872
1873
1875
1877
1879
1881
1883
1885
1889
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5
1
3
2
2
2
3
4
1
2
11
4
4
12

1909
1911
1913
1915
1917
1919
1921
1923
1925
192-7
1929
1933
1935

3
5
5
5
4
4
3
2
2
1
4
1
3

During the following years a few regulatory laws relating to liquor, and one or two in the field of insurance and
corporations were held invalid. Problems relating to the
creation of governmental offices and fixing duties and salaries, continued to account for a few additional invalid statutes. The session of 1881, however, enacted a substantial
number of statutes which were declared unconstitutional.
Courts, criminal procedure, abandoned animals, taxation and
local government, foreign companies doing sleeping car business in the state, mortgage foreclosure, local government and
drainage improvements, were among the subjects involved in
the invalid statutes. During the period from 1889 through
1891 there seemed also to be a number of invalid statutes,
and to some extent they reflect hints of coming groundswells
in politics and economics. The cases involved subjects such
as court affairs, details of governmental organization, establishment of a geology department, absentee voting, municipal governments, natural gas conservation, labor blacklisting, agricultural board, legislative apportionment, tax commission's power to punish for contempt, fireman's pension fund,
and registration of voters.
When one looks at the statutes from later sessions, such
as those of 1911, with courts, constitutional amendments,
railroads, wage payment legislation, and insurance regulation, or that of 1925, with garnishment legislation, and a
fire-arms law as the invalid enactments one comes to feel
that the picture is somewhat different from that which he
probably had in his mind as he approached this problem. The
inevitable impression is, that somehow this does not reveal
the courts acting as arbiters in a never-ending series of
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catastrophic social and economic struggles and playing the
part of great statesmen as well as that of judges. Throughout there appears a certain amount of distress legislation,
revealing itself under technical titles such as mortgage legislation, foreclosures, and the like. There seems to be an
inevitable litigiousness among us with respect to public offices and local governmental affairs, and we have not forgotten the schools in our contentiousness. Wage payment legislation seems to have troubled legislators more than other labor
legislation enacted during our state history. But most striking of all is the constant stream of unconstitutional legislation coming from the private bailiwick of the lawyers that
relates to courts, their organization and procedure. But, in
general, the role of the court in a state like Indiana has not
been that which is generally attributed to the Supreme Court
of the United States. Great economic and social conflicts
have accounted for less unconstitutional legislation than those
more properly called "squabbles."
II
What are the subjects with which unconstitutional statutes in Indiana have dealt? If the invalid statutes are
grouped into the familiar classifications and those subjects
listed which involved five or more statutes the data appears
as follows:
Subject
Courts
Crimes
Labor
Public Officers
Taxation
County Government
Liquor Control
Schools
Execution and garnishment
Municipal Government
Corporations
Estates
Highways
Property
Public Funds
Contracts

Townships

Statutes
35
16
15
15
11
9
9
9
8
8
7
7
6
6
6
5

5

In studying this list it is clear that legislation relating to
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courts in general, including the delegation of powers to courts
and withdrawal of power from them, has bulked large in the
unconstitional field. Problems of local government, likewise
have occupied the attention of the legislature and in their
attempts to tread their way through the maze of local government law legislators have at times lost their constitutional
way. In almost every state the experience reveals clearly
that some of our most troublesome constitutional problems
have centered around the problems of public officers, their
offices, and their selection.
Labor legislation, for example, accounts for more cases in
Indiana than in Minnesota, partly because Indiana is more
of an industrial state and partly because Indiana experimented
with various types of labor laws such as laws governing wage
payments at a time when the principles governing such enactments were not established on their modern basis.
M
The Constitutional provisions which proved to be the
greatest obstacles to legislation are listed below.

Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article

Number
Statutes
Constitutional Provision
Held Invalid
I, section 1, life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness
6
I, section 21, eminent domain and just compensation
9
I, section 23, privileges and immunities
12
I, section 23, obligations of contract
10
III, separation of powers
10
IV, section 19, acts to embrace one subject
22
IV, section 21, publication of act at full length
15
IV, section 22, local or special laws
27
IV, section 23, laws must be general and uniform
13
VI, section two, county offices
5
XII, section 1, judicial power

The figures given above are significant because of what
they reveal as to the bases on which statutes in Indiana have
been declared unconstitutional. The total number of cases
under the bill of rights is substantial, but it must be remembered that the bill of rights contains many particular provisions. The cases are distributed under a number of provisions, such as those on unreasonable searches and seizures,
due process of law, protection to persons accused of crime,
trial by jury, and others. The cases listed in Indiana under
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life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness would in many other
states appear under due process of law. Eminent domain has
given rise to a substantial number of cases, but not nearly
as many as might have been supposed. The cases under privileges and immunities in a number of other states would also
be classified under the more general due process provisions
found in many of the newer state constitutions which do
not contain any separate provision on privileges and immunities.
The group of cases under the obligation of contract is
due in part to the fact that Indiana is one of the older states,
having passed through various phases of the internal improvements period. It has also passed through a number
of depressions. Periods of this type are likely to produce
legislation which will run afoul of the obligation of contracts
clause. Some of the cases found in more recent years under
due process are also of the type affecting contract. Some of
the cases which earlier would have been considered under
the obligation of contracts would today be classified under
due process under the influence of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
But the striking thing about the facts reviewed in this
section is that such subjects as the separation of powers and
legislative procedure bulk as large as they do. The former
provision would normally be expected to have barred a number of statutes because of the legislative attempts to work
out an apportionment of governmental powers so as to enable our modern state government to operate with reasonable
efficiency in coping with modern regulatory problems. But
the number of cases found listed under the several constitutional provisions regulating the legislative process itself must
come as a surprise to most of us. In Article IV, sections 19,
21, 22, and 23 are found seventy-eight cases, or approximately one third of the total cases involved in the study. It must
be remembered that this is a phase of constitutional law that
is highly technical in character, and that in general statutes
declared unconstitutional in this group are declared to be
so not because of defects of substance, but rather because
of defects in legislative procedure. The line between substaitce and procedure is a pretty thin line, to be sure, and
there are some cases definitely related to the subject, such
as special and local laws, but to have such a large number of
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statutes invalidated primarily on grounds of procedure is
worthy of note.
This finding corresponds in general with the experience
in other states, but it should be noted also that the number
of statutes in this group is relatively high in Indiana as contrasted with a state like Mfinnesota. This is partially attributable to the fact that Indiana as a state passed through the
historical experiences such as wildcat banking, lending public
credit to private use, abuse of the power to grant monopolistic
franchises, etc., that gave rise to many of these detailed restrictions on legislative procedure, and as a result its public
and its judges were perhaps more sensitive to violations of
these provisions of the constitution. In part it is attributable
to the rapid turnover in the membership in the General Assembly of this state. Inexperienced lawmakers are more likely than experienced ones to make this type of mistake. It
doubtless does happen occasionally that mistakes in procedure
are not entirely errors of innocence but certainly in the great
majority of the cases the mistakes were honest mistakes.
There seems to be a tendency for the number of cases in
this class to decrease in more recent years, and this may be
due in part to the presence of an experienced and competent
drafting service established a generation ago as a legislative
service.
It is difficult to ascertain to what an extent technical
details of this type are stumbling blocks for legislation really
regarded as objectionable on other grounds. An analysis
of the subjects involved seems to bring out no marked correlation of any kind. It is well known, of course, that to
invalidate a statute on a technicality of this kind creates a
great psychological hurdle for the proponents of the measure,
and sustained public opinion will usually be required to overcome this handicap and obtain reenactment.
Some feel that the minute constitutional rules governing
legislative procedure are now outworn, and doubtless this is
true of some of those rules, but it should be remembered
that restrictions such as these still have a sound basis as
applied to the procedures in modern legislative bodies. However, it should be clear that it becomes increasingly unpardonable for legislators, to enact laws in conflict with many of these
rules of procedure, although it is recognized that a few of
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them are unworkable or unnecessary rules under modern conditions.
IV
The number of years elapsing between the enactment
of a statute and the time when it is declared constitutional
or unconstitutional may affect not only the attitude of the
court towards the statute but may affect the equities resulting from holding the statute unconstitutional. In some
instances great injustice may be done by holding a statute
to be invalid many years after it has been enacted and after
private parties and the administration and courts have relied
upon it and conformed their actions to it.
This is a subject that is intimately bound up with procedure and remedies. The common law system, and the
codes of procedure supplementing it on the procedural side,
is based upon the theory that law is law, and that no distinction should be made on the procedural side between cases
involving constitutional questions and those involving private law questions. This, of course, was a natural development in view of the fact that the American courts developed
the field of constitutional litigation with the assistance of
the bar as an incident to ordinary litigation, and developed
it slowly enough so that the public law phases of our legal
system did not attract attention as presenting any different
set of procedural problems from those arising in our private
law.
It is likewise worthy of notice that it is perfectly possible
under applicable procedures to have a constitutional issue
settled in a purely private litigation, without any representation of the public or the state or government as such. This
occurs in almost every state, and it raises a very serious
question as to the wisdom of permitting private parties to
settle between themselves the presentation of constitutional
issues to the courts. Every lawyer knows the extent to
which courts are dependent for assistance in such matters
upon the full canvass by the attorneys of all phases of the
questions involved. The public's interest may or may not
have a spokesman in such a case.
The average number of years elapsing between enactment and final decision in a group of one hundred and seventytwo cases in Indiana for which data was available was slightly

1941]

UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN INDIANA

109

under five years. Fifty cases involved statutes that were
on the books for more than five years. Seventeen statutes
were held invalid after periods ranging from ten to forty-two
years. The figures on this problem are much the same for
a great many states, those for example, from Minnesota corresponding very closely, on approximately the same number
of cases.
The data on the time elapsing between the initiation of
the case and the final decision in the court of last instance
is so meager as to permit of no general conclusion. But in
a group of twenty-two cases for which data was available
eight of the cases were in the process of litigation for two
years or more, four stayed in the courts for a period of between one and two years, and ten were settled within one
year. Here again, the Indiana experience is not out of line
with that of other states.
. These figures raise a question as to whether sufficient
attention has been paid in our thinking about constitutional
litigation to matters of procedure with a view to expediting
the settlement of questions that are essentially public in
nature rather than private in their implications. Five years
is certainly too long a period to wait for the public to learn
whether statutes are valid. Two years is certainly too long
a period for a constitutional question to remain undecided
in the courts.
V
The procedures or forms of action that are most used
in constitutional litigation are important because they cast
light on the problem of adequacy of present procedures and
because they give some additional clues to the parties and
situations involved in such litigation. Listing those actions
used in five or more cases the following data is presented.
Types of Action
No. of cases
Action on bond
6
Action to recover real estate
11
Action for damages and penalties
6
Contract
10
Criminal actions
36
Declaratory judgment
6
Debt
7
Injunction
32
Mandamus
20

Quo Warranto
Tort damages

12
23
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Several things stand out as one examines this list. There
are a great many injunction cases, a large number of criminal
actions, a large number of tort cases, and many mandamus
cases. In analyzing the criminal cases it appears that more
Indiana legislation in the traditional field of the bill of rights
has been assailed by defendants than has been true in some
states. A number of invalid statutes affected criminal procedure, others involved regulatory stautes, such as liquor laws,
food control laws, and wage payment legislation. A few related to miscellaneous topics such as public works contracts,
firearms, insurance, and illegal voting. It is apparently not
uncommon in Indiana for defense attorneys to make full use
of the contention that the statute authorizing prosecution is
unconstitutional. The experience here revealed can hardly
be expected to discourage the bar on this point. The use of
criminal procedure rather than administrative action in the
field of enforcement is also noticeable.
The quo warranto cases indicate, of course, that a number of unconstitutional statutes have dealt with problems of
office, the suffrage, and elections. The tort cases are interesting because they indicate that a substantial number of
Indiana cases may have been declared unconstitutional in
actions that were essentially private actions between private
parties. These are to be distinguished from cases of statutory
actions which are likely to be in accordance with a planned
public policy. In breaking down the figures for tort cases
the data reveals that in some instances they reflect the tendency in some fields of legislation to enlist the aid of the
adversely affected parties in cases of violation of the statute
in enforcing the statutory policy. At times this takes the
form of an action for statutory penalties. At other times a
right of action may be created where otherwise it would not
have existed. There are clearly a number of instances where
state acts were declared invalid in private litigation, however, and this raises serious questions of policy. Should not
the representatives of the state be notified in such cases?
It should be regarded as an encouraging sign that the
relatively new remedy, the declaratory judgment, is already
finding its way into this field. It is admirably adapted for
raising constitutional questions, and if accompanied with a
speedy appeals procedure would improve the administration
of justice.
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The injunction cases are of particular interest because
of their ability to halt law enforcement pending decision.
Under the first state constitution no cases involving unconstitutional statutes were initiated by injunction. In the
decade of the fifties, five cases used the remedy with success, but in the three following decades the remedy was little
used. The nineties saw five statutes fall by this remedy,
and the second decade of the present century again witnessed
its use with success on seven occasions. But in the last two
decades it has been utilized less than in the period between
1890 and 1900, on the one hand, and that of 1910 to 1920, on
the other. Clearly, in recent years, the injunction has not
been abused in Indiana constitutional litigation.
The use of the injunction has not been limited to attacks
on economic or social legislation. It has not been applied to
any particular class of cases, nor by any particular class of
litigants. The subjects of statutes involved in the injunction
cases arranged chronologically include: schools, road tax,
change of county seat, schools, laying out roads, railroad aid
bonds, qualifications for absentee voters, restricting exportation of natural gas, tax on foreign insurance companies,
elections and apportionment, creation of park board, city
boundaries, etc.
If anything is common to most of these cases it probably
is that injunction has been used t6 test the legality of proposed public expenditures in many of them. It has not been
used primarily to test social legislation, although of course,
it has been used to some extent.
VI
About one fourth of the Indiana constitutional cases
involved corporations as parties. The number of cases in
which corporations were parties plaintiff was slightly more
than half the total number of cases in this category. It
cannot be said that in Indiana corporations have been particularly successful in assailing statutes on the ground that
they were invalid.
It does not appear that any significant relationship exists between the statutory subjects and corporate participation in the litigation. There are, of course, a few cases in
which the statutes dealt with corporations as such, but these
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were few in number. In instances in which employer-employee relations were being legislated upon one might expect
to find a number of corporate parties because corporations
were becoming large employers during the period covered in
this study, but even here corporate' litigation was not disproportionate.
It is to be expected that more cases involving corporations would be found in the last fifty years than in the prior
fifty years because corporations increased in number during
this period and more statutes regulating corporations were
being enacted. Statutes regulating economic activity in
general were also being enacted in greater numbers and these
affected corporations in common with other business.
VII
Do the judges of the Supreme Court of Indiana often
divide among themselves on constitutional questions? Are
opinions by a bare majority the rare exception?
The questions raised by dissenting opinions are numerous and they have been discussed a great deal in legal literature. The Anglo-American method of reporting the name
of the judge who writes the opinion as well as of those who
vote for or against the decision naturally emphasizes the
personal views of the judge and thus it is hoped his responsibility will be increased. There has been a feeling in many
quarters that judges vote on constitutional questions differently from the way they vote on other types of legal issues,
and that they divide much more in this field than in others.
In fact, some even well informed persons seem to think that
unanimity of judicial opinion is relatively rare in the constitutional field.
The Indiana court has a greater number of decisions by
a bare majority than a state like Minnesota, but it is significant that these decisions do not generally seem to bear any
relation to the political divisions of the membership of the
court. A complete check of the political affiliations of judges
of the supreme court with cases reveal surprisingly few cases
in which the judges divided along political lines. In fact
they are so rare that they are almost conspicuous. Nor do
they seem to bear any relationship to any special types of
cases, having no correlation with any of the great social or

1941]

UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN INDIANA

113

economic questions which so often are thought to explain
3
much of what happens in this branch of the law.
The cases, however, in which dissents occur are brought
into court within a relatively shorter time after the enactment of the statutes involved than is true in general, and this,
while it does not prove that the issues are any more political
or social or economic than in the other cases, does indicate
sharper differences of opinion. But, as is brought out elsewhere, litigants sometimes become more excited about a problem of local self-government, or lawyers become more heated
about a problem of technical procedure in the courts of law,
than they do in some of the seemingly more fundamental
types of subjects.
The explanations for the number of opinions by a divided
court are perhaps several in number, but none of them seem
particularly conclusive. The learning of the practicing bar,
the tradition of the state in returning sitting judges irrespective of political affiliation, the methods of selecting candidates
for the bench, the degree of expertness present in the preparation of statutes enacted by the legislative body, the public
attitude towards expertness in the law, and numerous other
factors doubtless interweave to explain the number of bare
majority opinions and divided court opinions in any particular
state and court. The eleven cases with bare majority decisions, and the twelve cases with divided court decisions (voting four to one) are not particularly significant, although
they do represent slightly higher figures than some of the
other states.
The striking fact that stands out in this phase of the
study is that the great bulk of decisions in this field of the
law are by unanimous opinions. So far as Indiana is concerned the judges have thought surprisingly alike in the field
of unconstitutional legislation. It seems, from a preliminary
survey of a number of other states, that this is a fact that
is common to judicial experience in the states quite generally,
and that some writers have been mistaken in assuming that
judges usually divide upon constitutional issues in the state
courts.
sThe author is indebted to Mr. Wilbur Harrison of the Indiana
bar for aid in this task of checking.
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VIII
To what an extent are the lower courts reliable in their
estimates of what the highest court of the state will do on the
constitutionality of a statute? This question raises an important problem in the field of procedure, because if lower
courts are usually reliable it might well be argued that restrictions should be placed upon the bringing of such decisions
before the highest court. This is not to suggest that the
jurisdiction of the highest court could be closed to this class
of cases, but in some of the states as in the federal system,
the number of constitutional questions presented to the supreme court has caused some to ask whether all of the cases
really are meritorious actions.
Limiting the inquiry to those cases in which the trial
court held the statute valid and in which the highest court
held the statutes invalid the Indiana data shows ninety-six
instances in which this occurred. This is almost half the
total number of cases involved in this study, and it indicates
quite conclusively that constitutional cases involve questions
upon which the trial courts are either unwilling or unable to
anticipate the decisions in the highest court of the state. The
reasons for this are not far to seek. In the first place, much
doubt and confusion exists in many fields of constitutional law
so that it would be virtually impossible for the trial courts
to know with any degree of precision what the rules or
principles of law are that will be applied to the particular case.
In the second place, trial courts are local courts, and as such
are likely under a system of popular election of judges to feel
the pressure of local opinion which may favor the validity of
the statutes involved. In the third place, there seems to be
a tendency in many lower courts to assume that a statute
ought not to be declared unconstitutional by the lower courts
unless the statute is so palpably invalid that the conclusion
is inescapable, because the invalidation of a statute is a serious
legal and political action for a court to take.
It should be observed that no particular reflection rests
upon the lower courts of Indiana as a result of these findings.
Instead, the data rather indicates that the lower courts are
performing their function precisely as one would expect them
to perform it.

LIST OF INDIANA STATUTES (1816-1935) HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGED

ACCORDING

TO CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATED

PROVISION

STATE CONSTITUTION (1816)
ARTICLE I
Section 5. "That in all civil cases, where the value in controversy
shall exceed the sum of seventy dollars, and in all criminal cases,
except in petit misdemeanors, which shall be punished by fine only,
not exceeding three dollars, in such manner as the legislature may
prescribe by law, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."
Acts 1817, 2nd Sess., c. 4; Clark v. Ellis, 2 Blackf. 8 (Ind. 1826).
Section 18. "No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the
validity of contracts, shall ever be made; and no conviction shall work
corruption of blood, nor forfeiture of estate."
Acts 1821, c. 44, §15, Lewis v. Brackenridge, 1 Blackf. 220 (Ind.
1822).
ARTICLE II
"The powers of the government of Indiana, shall be divided into
three distinct departments, and each of them to be confided to a
separate body of magistracy, to-wit; those which are legislative, to
one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are
judiciary, to another; and no person or collection of persons, being
of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached
to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted."
Local Laws 1844, 29th Sess., c. 308; Young v. State Bank, 4 Ind.

301 (1853).
STATE CONSTITUTION 1851
ARTICLE I
Section 1. "We declare, that all men are created equal; that they
are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that all
power is inherent in the people; and that all free governments are,
and of right ought to be, founded on their authority, and instituted
for their peace, safety, and well being. For the advancement of these
ends, the people have, at all times, an indefeasible right to alter and
reform their government.
Acts 1855, c. 105, Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855); Herman v.
State, 8 Ind. 545 (1855).
Acts 1881, c. 96, Kuntz vs. Sunmption, 117 Ind. 1, 19 N.E. 474 (1889).
Acts 1899, c. 124, Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. State, 160 Ind. 379,
66 N.E. 1005 (1903).
(115)
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Acts 1901, c. 92, State ex rel Geake v. Fox, 158 Ind. 126, 63 N.E.
19 (1902).
Acts 1917, c. 2, Bennett v. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, 116 N.E. 921
(1917).
Acts 1925, c. 207, §14, Powers v. State, 204 Ind. 472, 184 N.E. 549
(1933).
Section 11. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure,
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized."
Acts 1855, c. 105, Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855).
Acts 1925, c. 48, §3, Wallace v. State, 199 Ind. 317, 157 N.E.
657 (1927).
Section 12. "All courts shall be open; and every man, for injury
done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without
purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, without delay."
Acts 1855, c. 105, Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855).
Acts 1881, c. 43, §10, c. 44, §23, Campbell v. Durggins, 83 Ind. 473
(1882); Tyler, Twp. Trustee v. State ex rel., 83 Ind. 563 (1882).
Section 13. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county in
which the offense shall have been committed; to be heard by himself
and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
Acts 1861, Spec. Sess., c. 32, Landringham v. State, 49 Ind. 186
(1874).
Acts 1873, c. 59, McLaughlin v. State, 45 Ind. 338 (1873).
Acts 1905, c. 88, §1, Althoff v. State, 209 Ind. 42, 197 N.E. 896
(1935).
Acts 1915, c. 62, Hinshaw v. State, 188 Ind. 147, 122 N.E. 418
(1919).
Acts 1919, c. 30, Glendale Coal Co. v. Douglas, Pros. Att'y, 193
Ind. 73, 137 N.E. 615 (1923).
Section 14. "No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same
offense. No person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled
to testify against himself."
Acts 1861, c. 74, State v. Enochs, 69 Ind. 314 (1879).
Acts 1873, c. 59, §12, Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877).
Section 20. "In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate ."
Ac s 1917, c. 77, §6, Millers Nat. Ins. Co. v. American State Bank,
206 Ind. 511, 190 N.E. 433 (1934).
Acts 1929, c. 12, W. T. Raleigh Co. v. Snider, 207 Ind. 686, 194
N.E. 356 (1935); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Harvey. 209 Ind.
262, 198 N.E. 782 (1935).
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Section 21. "No man's particular services shall be demanded, without just compensation. No man's property shall be taken by law,
without just compensation; nor, except in case of the State, without
just compensation first assessed and tendered."
Acts 1852, c. 1, Art. II, §15, Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525 (1853).
Acts 1855, c. 57, amending Acts 1852, 1 REV. STAT. (1852), c. 46,
§24, Blackman v. Halves, 72 Ind. 515 (1880).
Acts 1852, 1 REV. STAT. (1852) c. 27, §16, Strong v. Clem, 12 Ind. 37
(1859).
Acts 1855, c. 105, Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855).
Acts 1861, c. 63, Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 455 (1873); Stewart v.
Hartman, 46 Ind. 331 (1874).
Acts 1889, c. 192, Logan v. Stogdale, 123 Ind. 372, 24 N.E. 135
(1890).
Acts 1893, c. 130, §4, The B. & 0. Southwestern Ry. v. Read,
158 Ind. 25, 62 N.E. 488 (1902).
Acts 1911, c. 288, Harmon v. Bolley, 187 Ind. 511, 120 N.E. 33
(1918).
Acts 1915, c. 57, Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155
N.E. 465 (1927).
Section 22. "The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary
comforts of life, shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a
reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale, for the payment
of any debt or liability hereafter contracted; and there shall be no
imprisonment for debt, except in case of fraud."
Acts 1852, 2 REV. STAT. (1852) part 4, c. 3, §§ 3, 4, Byers v. State
ex rel. Hutchinson, 20 Ind. 47, (1863).
Acts 1852, 2 REV. STAT. (1852), part 3, c. 1, Art. XII, § 128,
Thompson v. State, 16 Ind. 516 (1861).
Acts 1855, c. 105, Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855).
Section 23. "The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen,
or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which upon the same
terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens."
Acts 1885, c. 21, §3, McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240, 192 N.E.
260 (1934).
Acts 1885, c. 30, Clark v. American Cannel Coal Co., 165 Ind. 213,
73 N.E. 1083 (1905).
Acts 1885, c. 54, McClelland v. State ex rel. Speer, 138 Ind. 321,
37 N.E. 1089(1894).
Acts 1889, c. 112, City of Evansville v. State ex rel. Blend, 118
Ind. 426, 21 N.E. 267 (1889); State ex rel Holt v. Denny,
118 Ind. 449, 21 N.E. 274 (1889); State ex rel. Law v. Blend,
121 Ind. 514, 23 N.E. 511 (1890).
Acts 1901, c. 112, Street v. Varney Co., 160 Ind. 338, 66 N.E. 895
(1903).
Acts 1901, c. 237, Dixon v. Poe, 159 Ind. 492, 65 N.E. 518 (1902).
Acts 1903, c. 158, State v. Wiggam, 187 Ind. 159, 118 N.E. 684
(1918).
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Acts 1911, c. 178, C.C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Schuler, 182 Ind. 57,
105 N.E. 567 (1914).
Acts 1911, c. 216, Fidelity Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Purlee, 192
Ind. 106, 135 N.E. 385 (1922).
Acts 1915, c. 184, Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State, 188 Ind. 173,
122 N.E. 584 (1919).
Acts 1919, c. 93, Dairs Const. Co. v. Bd. of Comm. of Boone County,
192 Ind. 144, 132 N.E. 629 (1921); Hays v. Bd. of Comm. of
Owen County, 192 Ind. 287, 136 N.E. 13 (1922).
Acts 1925, c. 61, Martin v. Loula, 208 Ind. 346, 194 N.E. 178 (1935).
Section 24. "No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation
of contract, shall ever be passed."
Acts 1840, c. 27, §3, Strong v. Daniel, 5 Ind. 348 (1854).
Acts 1855, c. 105, Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855).
Acts 1875, c. 112, Helpherstine v. Meredith, 84 Ind. 1 (1882);
Parkham v. Vandeventer, 82 Ind. 198 (1882); Voltz v. Rowles,
85 Ind. 198 (1882).
Acts 1881, c. 88, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brouse, 83 Ind. 62 (1882).
Acts 1881, c. 70, Dinckerlocker v. March, 75 Ind. 548 (1881).
Acts 1881, c. 76, Downing v. State Board of Argiculture, 129 Ind.
443, 28 N.E. 614 (1891).
Acts 1891, c. 92, Johnson v. Bd. of Comm. of Randolph County,
140 Ind. 152, 39 N.E. 311 (1894).
Acts 1901, c. 222, Johnson v. Gehbauer, 159 Ind. 271, 64 N.E. 855
(1902).
Acts 1915, c. 129, City of Ind'p'ls v. Robison, 186 Ind. 660, 117
N.E. 861 (1917).
Acts 1919, c. 168, §1, Greensburg Water Co. v. Lewis, 189 Ind.
439, 128 N.E. 103 (1920).
Acts 1935, c. 319, §2, Conter v. State ex rel. Berezner, 211
Ind. 659, 8 N.E. (2d) 75 (1937).
ARTICLE II
Section 2. "In all elections not otherwise provided for by this Constitution, every citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one
years and upwards, who shall have resided in the State during the
six months, and in the township sixty days, and in the ward or precinct thirty days immediately preceding such election, shall be entitled
to vote in the township or precinct where he or she may reside."
Acts 1867, c. 51, §1, Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485 (1871).
Acts 1889, c. 87, §13, Morris v. Powell, 125 Ind. 281, 25 N.E. 221
(1890).
Acts 1891, c. 144, Brewer v. McClelland, 144 Ind. 423, 32 N.E.
299 (1892).
Acts 1917, c. 31, Bd. of Election Comm'rs v. Knight, 187 Ind. 108,
117 N.E. 650 (1917).
Section 4. "No person shall be deemed to have lost his residence
in the State, by reason of his absence, either on business of this State
or of the United States."
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Acts 1891, c. 144, Brewer v. McCleland, 144 Ind. 423, 32 N.E. 299
(1892).
Section 13. "All elections by the People shall be by ballot; and all
elections by the General Assembly, or by either branch thereof, shall
be viva voce."
Acts 1869 Spec. Sess., c. 31, §2, Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 89 (1871).
Section 14. "All general elections shall be held on the First Tuesday
after the first Monday in November, but township elections may be
held at such times as may be provided by law; Provided, that the
General Assembly may provide, by law for the election of all Judges
of courts of general and appellate jurisdiction, by an election to be held
for such officers only, at which time no other officer shall be voted
for; and shall also provide for the registration of all persons entitled
to vote."
Acts 1903, c. 13, Gemmer v. State ex rel. Stephens, 163 Ind. 150,
71 N.E. 478 (1904).
Acts 1929, c. 27, Robinson v. Moser, 203 Ind. 66, 179 N.E. 270
(1931).
ARTICLE III
"The powers of the Government are divided into three separate departments: The Legislative, the Executive including the Administrative,
and the Judicial; and no person, charged with official duties under
one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided."
Acts 1855, c. 115, Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855).
Acts 1881, Spec. Sess., c. 36, §§ 296, 310, Butler vv. State, 97 Ind.,
373 (1884).
Acts 1883, c. 83, State ex rel. Worrell v. Peelle, 121 Ind. 495, 22
N.E. 654 (1889).
Acts 1889, c. 32, State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21
N.E. 244 (1889).
Acts 1889, c.33, State ex rel. Yancey v. Hyde, 121 Ind. 20, 22 N.E.
644 (1889).
Acts 1889, c. 112, City of Evansville v. State ex rel Blend, 118
Ind. 426, 21 N.E. 267 (1889).
Acts 1889, c. 119, State ex rel, Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382,
21 N.E. 252 (1889).
Acts 1901, c. 222, Johnson v. Gebhauer, 159 Ind. 271, 64 N.E. 885
(1902).
Acts 1917, c. 143, §3, Gray v. McLaughlin, 191 Ind. 190, 131 N.E.
518 (1921).
Acts 1927, c. 258, In re Northwestern Ind. Tele. Co., 201 Ind. 667,
171 N.E. 65 (1930).
ARTICLE IV
Section 1. "The Legislative authority of the state shall be vested
in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives. The style of every law shall be: Be it enacted
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by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana and no law shall be
enacted, except by bill."
Acts 1853, c. 66, Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342 (1853).
Acts 1911, c. 118, Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1 (1912).
Section 4. "The General Assembly shall, at its second session after
the adoption of this Constitution, and every sixth year thereafter,
cause an enumeration to be made of all the male inhabitants over the
age of twenty-one years."
Acts 1891, c. 91, Parker v. State ex rel. Powell, 133 Ind. 178,
33 N.E. 119 (1892).
Acts 1893, c. 165, Denny v. State ex rel. Basler, 144 Ind. 503,
42 N.E. 929 (1896).
Acts 1903, c. 206, Brooks v. State ex rel. Singer, 162 Ind. 568,
70 N.E. 980 (1904).
Section 19. "Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters
properly connected therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the
title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not
be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much
thereof as shall not be expressed in the title."
Acts 1852, 2 REV. sTAT. (1852), part 3, c. 4, Gillespie v. State, 9
Ind. 380 (1857); Foley v. State, 9 Ind. 363 (1857).
Acts 1852, 1 REV. STAT. (1852), c. 77, § 1, 2, Merrhorter v. Price,
11 Ind. 199 (1858).
Acts 1852, 2 REV. STAT. (1852), part 4, c. 1, § 70, Keehns v. Krammis, 20 Ind. 490 (1863).
Acts 1852, 2 REV. STAT. (1852), c. 18, State v. Wilson, 7 Ind. 516
(1856).
Acts 1855, c. 67, Igoe v. State, 14 Ind. 239 (1860); Grubbs v. State,
24 Ind. 295 (1865).
Acts 1859, c. 130, § 14, Lauer v. State, 22 Ind. 461 (1864).
Acts 1867, c. 9, Board of Comm. of Madison County v. Baker, 80
Ind. 374 (1881).
Acts 1873, c. 59, § 9, State v. Young, 47 Ind. 150 (1874).
Acts 1873, c. 73, Byrne v. State, 47 Ind. 120 (1874).
Acts 1883, c. 137, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Moore, Admx., 197 Ind.
50, 149 N.E. 718 (1925).
Acts 1889, c. 166, Wabash Ry. Co. v. Young, 162 Ind. 102, 69
N.E. 1003 (1904).
Acts 1891, c. 192, Henderson v. L. & L. Ins. Co., 135 Ind. 23, 34
N.E. 565 (1893).
Acts 1899, c. 110, State v. Dorsey, 167 Ind. 199, 78 N.E. 843 (1906).
Acts 1899, c. 134, State ex rel. Hart v. Comm. Ins. Co., 158 Ind.
680, 64 N.E. 466 (1902).
Acts 1901, c. 50, Ind'p'ls Northern Traction Co. v. Brennan, 174
Ind. 1, 87 N.E. 215 (1909).
Acts 1909, c. 87, Morgan v. State, 179 Ind. 300, 101 N.E. 6 (1913).
Acts 1913, c. 11, §1, State v. Billings, 202 Ind. 135, 168 N.E.
453 (1929).
Acts 1913, c. 51, §2, Hobbs v. Gibson Sch. Twp., 195 Ind. 1,
144 N.E. 526 (1924).
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Acts 1913, c. 215, Neddenman v. State, 198 Ind. 187, 152 N.E. 800
(1926).
Acts 1921, c. 25, Crabbs v. State, 193 Ind. 248, 139 N.E. 180 (1923).
Acts 1923, c. 186, Jackson, Sec'y of State v. State ex rel., 194
Ind. 248, 142 N.E. 423 (1924).
Section 20. "Every act and joint resolution shall be plainly worded,
avoiding as far as practicable, the use of technical terms."
Acts 1907, c. 205, R. R. Comm- of Ind. v. Grand Trunk Western
Rd. Co., 179 Ind. 255, 100 N.E. 852 (1913).
Section 21. "No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere
reference to its title, but the act revised, or section amended, shall
be set forth and published at full length."
Acts 1853, c. 34, Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. 327 (1854).
Acts 1853, c. 35, §7, Littler v. Smiley, 9 Ind. 116 (1857).
Acts 1853, c. 38, §§1, 2, 3, 4, Wilkins v. Miller, 9 Ind. 100 (1857).
Acts 1853, c. 38, §4, Armstrong v. Berreman, 13 Ind. 422 (1859).
Acts 1855, c. 31, §§1, 2, Niblack v. Goodman, 67 Ind. 174 (1879).
Acts 1855, c. 61, Cowley v. Rushville, 60 Ind. 327 (1878).
Acts 1859, c. 114, Dodd v. State, 18 Ind. 56 (1862).
Acts 1867, c. 117, Martinsville v. Freize, 33 Ind. 507 (1870).
Acts 1875, c. 89, State ex rel. Dickerson v. Harrison, 67 Ind. 71
(1879).
Acts 1875, c. 91, Blackmore v. Dolan, 50 Ind. 194 (1875).
Acts 1883, c. 130, Feibleman v. State ex rel. Brofn, 98 Ind. 516
(1884).
Acts 1889, c. 112, City of Evansville v. State ex rel Blend, 118
Ind. 426, 21 N.E. 267 (1889).
Acts 1891, c. 160, Mankin v. Penn. Co., 160 Ind. 447, 67 N.E. 229
(1903).
Acts 1891, c. 179, Void Stoney Creek v. Kabel, 144 Ind. 501, 43
N.E. 559 (1896).
Acts 1899, c. 16, Hendershot v. State ex rel. Bennett, 162 Ind. 69,
69 N.E. 679 (1904).
Section 22. "The General Assembly shall not pass local or special
laws, in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say:"
Acts 1852, 2 RzV. STAT. (1852), part 1, c. 8, §38, Cowdin v. Huff,
10 Ind. 83 (1858).
Acts 1852, 1 REV. STAT. (1852), c. 98, §130, Greencastle v. Black,
5 Ind. 557 (1854).
Acts 1853, c. 21, Thomas v. Board of Comm. of Clay County, 5
Ind. 4 (1854).
Acts 1853, c. 93, §3, Madison & Ind. R.R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind.
217 (1856).
Acts 1855, c. 25, Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 332 (1855).
Acts 1855, c. 87, City of Lafayette & Martin County Treasurer
v. Jenners, 10 Ind. 70 (1858).
Acts 1871, c. 17, Fulk v. Monroe County, 46 Ind. 150 (1874).
Acts 1871, c. 15, Campbell v. Ind'p'ls, 155 Ind. 186, 57 N.E. 920
(1900).
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Acts 1875, c. 48, Reissner v. Hurle, 50 Ind. 424 (1875); Martin v.
Reissner, 54 Ind. 217 (1876).
Acts 1877, c. 72, C. C. and Ind. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Board of Comm.
of Grant County, 65 Ind. 427 (1879).
Acts 1879, c. 37, Mitchell v. McCorkle, 69 Ind. 184 (1879).
Acts 1889, c. 112, Evansville v. State ex rel. Blend, 118 Ind. 426,
21 N.E. 267 (1889); State ex rel. Holt v. Denny, 118 Ind.
449, 21 N.E. 274 (1889).
Acts 1889, c. 119, State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382,
21 N.E. 252 (1889).
Acts 1891, c- 294, State ex rel. Ed. of Comm. of Benton Co. v.
Boice, 140 Ind. 506, 39 N.E. 64 (1894).
Acts 1893, c. 130, Richey v. C. C. C. & St. L. Ry., 176 Ind. 542,
96 N.E. 694 (1911).
Acts 1895, c. 105, Bd. of Comm. of Jackson Co. v. State ex rel.
Shields, 155 Ind. 604, 58 N.E. 1037 (1900).
Acts 1899, c. 53, Kraus v. Lehman, 170 Ind. 408, 83 N.E. 714
(1908).
Acts 1899, c. 130, Ed. of Comm. of Newton County v. State ex
rel. Bringham, 161 Ind. 616, 69 N.E. 442 (1904).
Acts 1899, c. 189, Bd. of Comm. of Owen County v. Spangler, 159
Ind. 575, 65 N.E. 743 (1902).
Acts 1903, c. 79, Donaldson v. State ex rel., 182 Ind. 615, 101 N.E.
485 (1913).
Acts 1903, c. 198, Rushville v. Hayes, 162 Ind. 193, 70 N.E. 134
(1904).
Acts 1907, c. 64, Armstrong v. State, 170 Ind. 188, 84 N.E. 3 (1908).
Acts 1907, c. 5, §§11, 12, Ed. of Comm'rs v. Albright, 168 Ind.
564, 81 N.E. 578 (1907).
Acts 1909, c. 38, Bullock v. Robinson, 176 Ind. 198, 93 N.E. 998
(1911).
Acts 1921, c. 160, Acts 1919, c. 55, Heffelfinger v. Ft. Wayne,
196 Ind. 689, 149 N.E. 555 (1925).
Acts 1933, c. 31, Heckler v. Conter, 206 Ind. 376, 187 N.E. 878
(1933).
Section 23. "In all the cases, enumerated in the preceding section,
and in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable,
all laws shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the
state."
Acts 1852, 2 RaV. STAT. (1852), part 1, c. 8, §38, Cowdin v. Huff,
10 Ind. 83 (1858).
Acts 1853, c. 21, Thomas v. Ed. of Comm. of Clay Co., 5 Ind. 4,
(1854).
Acts 1853, c. 66, Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342 (1853).
Acts 1875, c. 48, Reissner v. Hurle, 50 Ind. 424 (1875); Martin
v. Reissner, 54 Ind. 217 (1876).
Acts 1877, c. 72, C. C. & Ind. Ry. Co. v. Ed. of Comm. of Grant
Co., 65 Ind. 427 (1879).
Acts 1879, c. 37, Mitchell v. McCorkle, 69 Ind. 184 (1879).
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Acts 1889, c. 112, Evansville v. State ex rel. Blend 118 Ind. 426,
21 N.E. 267 (1889).
Acts 1891, c. 194, State ex rel. Bd. of Comm. of Benton Co. v.
Boice, 140 Ind. 506, 39 N.E. 64 (1894).
Acts 1903, c. 158, State v. Wiggam, 187 Ind. 159, 118 N.E. 684
(1918).
Acts 1907, c. 64, Armstrong v. State, 170 Ind. 188, 84 N.E. 3 (1908).
Acts 1921, c. 218, Keane v. Remy, 201 Ind. 286, 168 N.E. 10 (1929).
Section 28. "No act shall take effect, until the same shall have been
published and circulated in the several counties of the state, by authority, except in case of emergency; Which emergency shall be declared in the preamble, or in the body of the law."
Acts 1859, c. 93, Mark v. State ex rel. Bowless, 15 Ind. 98 (1860).
Acts 1881, REv. STAT. (1881), c. 32, §124 Cain v. Gade, 84 Ind.
209 (1882).
ARTICLE V
Section 14. "Every bill which shall have passed the General Assembly, shall be presented to the Governor; if he approve, he shall
sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to the
House in which it shall have originated; which house shall enter the
objections, at large, upon its journals, and proceed to reconsider the
bill,-But no bill shall be presented to the Governor, within two days
next previous to the final adjournment of the General Assembly."
Acts 1889, c. 112, City of Evansville v. State ex rel. Blend, 118
Ind. 426, 21 N.E. 267 (1889).
Acts 1909, c. 4, Woessner v. Bullock, 176 Ind. 166, 93 N.E. 1057
(1911).
Section 17. "He (The Governor) shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses
except treason and cases of impeachment, subject to such regulations
as may be provided by law."
Acts 1881 Spec. Sess., c. 36, §§296, 310, Butler v. State, 97 Ind.
373 (1884).
ARTICLE VI
Section 2. "There shall be elected, in each county by the voters
thereof, at the time of holding general elections, a Clerk of the Circuit
Court, Auditor, Recorder, Treasurer, Sheriff, Coroner, and Surveyor.
The Clerk, Auditor and Recorder, shall continue in office four years;
and no person shall be eligible to the office of Clerk, Recorder, or
Auditor more than eight years in any period of twelve years. The
Treasurer, Sheriff, Coroner, and Surveyor, shall continue in office
two years; and no person shall be eligible to the office of Treasurer
or Sheriff, more than four years in any period of six years."
Acts 1852, 1 lzv. STAT. (1852), c. 115, §7, The Governor v. Nelson,
6 Ind. 496 (1855).
Acts 1855, c. 11, Howard v. State ex rel. Vanater, 10 Ind. 99 (1858).
Acts 1901, c. 182, Russell v. State ex rel. Crowder, 171 Ind. 623,
87 N.E. 13 (1909).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

Acts 1903, c. 13, Gemmer v. State ex rel. Stephens, 163 Ind. 150,
71 N:E. 478 (1904).
Acts 1929, c. 59, Enmeier v. Blaize, 203 Ind. 475, 181 N.E. 1 (1932).
ARTICLE VII
Section 1. "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a
Supreme Court, Circuit Courts and such other courts as the General
Assembly may establish."
Acts 1881 Spec. Sess. c. 38, §419, Shoultz v. McPheeters, 79 Ind.
373 (1881).
Acts 1881 Spec. Sess. c. 36, §111, Gregory v. State ex rel. Gudgel,
94 Ind. 384 (1884).
Acts 1889, c. 32, State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21
N.E. 244 (1889).
Acts 1889, c. 224, State ex rel. Worrell v. Carr, 129 Ind. 44, 28
N.E. 88 (1891).
Acts 1891, c. 99, §129, Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31
N.E. 190 (1892).
Acts 1911, c. 117, Ex parte France, 176 Ind. 72, 95 N.E. 515 (1911).
Acts 1935, c. 82, State ex rel. Youngblood v. Warrick Circuit Court,
208 Ind. 594, 196 N.E. 254 (1935).
Section 4. "The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction, coextensive
with the limits of the State, in appeals and writs of error, under such
regulations and restrictions as may be prescribed by law. It shall
also have such original jurisdiction as the General Assembly may
confer."
Acts 1913, c. 166, Curless v. Watson, 180 Ind. 86, 120 N.E. 497
(1913).
Section 5. "The Supreme Court shall, upon the decision of every
case, give a statement in writing of each question arising in the
record of such case, and the decision of the court thereon."
Acts 1889, c. 32, State ex rel Hovey v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21
N.E. 244 (1889).
Acts 1889, c. 57, Ex parte Griffiths; 118 Ind. 83, 20 N.E. 513
(1889); Griffin v. State ex rel. Griffiths, 119 Ind. 520, 22
N.E. 7 (1889).
Section 6. "The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for the
speedy publication of the decisions of the Supreme Court, made under
this constitution; but no Judge shall be allowed to report such decisions."
Acts 1889, c. 57, Ex parte Griffiths, 118 Ind. 83, 20 N.E. 513
(1889); Griffin v. State ex rel. Griffiths, 119 Ind. 520, 22
N.E. 7 (1889).
Section 9. "The state shall, from time to time be divided into
dicial circuits; and a judge for each circuit shall be elected by
voters thereof. He shall reside within the circuit, and shall hold
office for the term of six years, if he so long behaves well."
Acts 1885, c. 19, State ex rel. Howard v. Johnson, 101 Ind.
(1885).
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Section 10. "The General Assembly may provide, by law, that the
judge of one circuit may hold the Courts of another circuit, in cases
of necessity or convenience; and in cases of temporary inability of any
Judge, from sickness or other cause, to hold the Courts in his circuit,
provision may be made, by law, for holding such courts.
Acts 1935, c. 82, State ex rel. Youngblood v. Warrick Circuit Court
208 Ind. 594, 196 N.E. 254 (1935).
Section 11. "There shall be elected, in each Judicial circuit, by
voters thereof, a Prosecuting Attorney, who shall hold his office
two years."
Acts 1885, c. 19, State ex rel. Howard v. Johnson, 101 Ind.
(1885).
Acts 1929, c. 27, Robinson v. Moser, 203 Ind. 66, 179 N.E.
(1931).
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Section 12. "Any Judge or Prosecuting Attorney, who shall have
been convicted of corruption or other high crime, may, on information in the name of the state, be removed from office by the Supreme
Court, or in such other manner as may be prescribed by law."
Acts 1897, c. 182, §19, State v. Redman, 183 Ind. 332, 109 N.E. 184
(1915).
ARTICLE VIII
Section 1. "Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a
community being essential to the preservation of a free government;
it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all
suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system
of common schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and
equally open to all."
Acts 1855, c. 87, City of Lafayette and Martin County Treas. v.
Jenners, 10 Ind. 70 (1858).
Section 2. "The Common School fund shall consist of the Congressional
Township fund, and the lands belonging thereto:
The Surplus Revenue fund;
The Saline fund and the lands belonging thereto;
The Bank tax fund, and the fund arising from the one hundred
and fourteenth section of the charter of the State Bank of Indiana;
The fund to be derived from the sale of county seminaries, and
the moneys and property heretofore held for such Seminaries; from
the fines assessed for breaches of the penal laws of the State; and
from all forfeitures which may accrue.
All lands and other estate which shall escheat to the State, for
want of heirs or kindred entitled to the inheritance;
All lands that have been, or may hereafter be, granted to the
State, where no special purpose is expressed in the grant, and the
proceeds of the sales thereof; including the proceeds of the sales of
the swamp lands, granted to the State of Indiana by the act of Congress of the twenty-eighth of September, eighteen hundred and fifty,
after deducting the expense of selecting and draining the same;
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Taxes on the property of corporations, that may be assessed by
the General Assembly for common school purposes.
Acts 1865, Spec. Sess., c. 38, Ed. of Comm. of Howard County v.
State ex rel. Michener, 120 Ind. 282, 22 N.E. 255 (1889).
Section 7. "All trust funds, held by the state, shall remain inviolate,
and be faithfully and exclusively applied to the purposes for which
the trust was created."
Acts 1852, 1 REV. STAT. (1852), c. 98, State v. Springfield Township, 6 Ind. 83 (1854).
Section 8. "The General Assembly shall provide
by the voters of the state, of a state Superintendent
tion; who shall hold his office for two years, and
compensation shall be prescribed by law."
Acts 1855, c. 87, City of Lafayette and Martin
Jenners, 10 Ind. 70 (1858).

for the election,
of Public Instrucwhose duties and
County Treas. v.

ARTICLE X
Section 1. "The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation; and shall prescribe
such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all
property, both real and personal, excepting such only for municipal,
educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes, as
may be specifically exempted by law."
Acts 1859, c. 27, §20, Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223 (1866).
Acts 1872, Spec. Sess., c. 37, §7, clause 8, State ex rel. Tieman
v. Indianapolis, 69 Ind. 375 (1879).
Section 5. "No law shall authorize any debt to be contracted, on behalf of the State, except in the following cases: To meet casual deficits
in the revenue; to pay the interest on the State debt; to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or, if hostilities be threatened, provide
for the public defense."
Acts 1921, c. 77, Scott v. Ind. Ed. of Agriculture, 192 Ind. 311,
136 N.E. 129 (1922).
Section 6. "No county shall subscribe for stock in any incorporated
company, unless the same be paid for at the time of such subscription;
nor shall any county loan its credit to any incorporated company,
nor borrow money for the purpose of taking stock in any such company; nor shall the General Assembly ever, on behalf of the State,
assume the debts of any county, city, town or township, nor of any
corporation whatever."
Acts 1921, c. 77, Scott v. Ind. Ed. of Agriculture, 192 Ind. 311,
136 N.E. 129 (1922).
Section 13. "Corporations, other than banking, shall not be created
by special act, but may be formed under general laws."
Acts 1873, c. 65, Marion Trust Co. v. Bennett, 169 Ind. 346, 82
N.E. 782 (1907).

1941]

INDIANA STATUTES HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL

127

Acts 1883, c. 111, In re: App. of Bank of Commerce, 153 Ind. 460,
53 N.E. 950 (1899).
Acts 1903, c. 105, Longview v. Crawfordsville, 164 Ind. 117, 73
N.E. 78 (1905).
Acts 1923, c. 26, Rosecranz v. Evansville, 194 Ind. 499, 143 N.E.
593 (1924).
ARTICLE XV
Section 1. "All officers, whose appointment is not otherwise provided
for in this Constitution, shall be chosen in such manner as now is,
or hereafter may be prescribed by law."
Acts 1883, c. 83, State ex rel. Worrell v. Peelle, 121 Ind. 495,
22 N.E. 654 (1889).
Acts 1889, c. 33, State ex rel. Yancey v. Hyde, 121 Ind. 20, 22
N.E. 644 (1889).
Section 2. "When the duration of any office is not provided for by
this Constitution, it may be declared by law; and, if not so declared,
such office shall be held during the pleasure of the authority making
the appointment. But the General Assembly shall not create any office,
the tenure of which shall be longer than four years."
Acts 1895, c. 35, Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Claypool, 149 Ind.
193, 48 N.E. 228 (1897).
Section 3. "Whenever it is provided in this Constitution, or in any
law which may be hereafter passed, that any officer, other than a
member of the General Assembly, shall hold his office for any given
term, the same shall be construed to mean that such officer shall hold
his office for such term and until his successor shall have been elected
and qualified."
Acts 1903, c. 13, Gemmer v. State ex rel. Stephens, 163 Ind. 150,
71 N.E. 478 (1904).
Acts 1929, c.59, Onmeier v-Blaize, 203 Ind. 475, 181 N.E. 1 (1932).

